Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey

Article 10

January 1985

Tax Law
Stacy Snowman

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stacy Snowman, Tax Law, 15 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1985).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Snowman: Tax Law

TAX LAW
NINTH CIRCUIT REJECTS PRESUMPTION
OF DISGUISED DIVIDENDS SOLELY BASED
ON A LACK OF DIVIDEND PAYMENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Elliots, Inc. v. Commissioner,l the Ninth Circuit, rejected
the McCandless automatic dividend 2 rule and held that the absence of dividends, combined with the presence of a sole officershareholder of a profitable corporation, does not automatically
lead to the presumption that compensation payments necessarily contain disguised dividends. 3
Elliots, Inc. (the corporation) was an Idaho corporation engaged in the business of selling equipment manufactured by
John Deere Company." Edward G. Elliot (Elliot) served as the
chief executive officer since the entity was incorporated in 1952
and as the sole shareholder since 1954. 11 The corporation, though
1. 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Skopil,
J. and Fletcher, J.).
2. Charles McCandless Tile Servo V. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970). In
McCandless, the Court of Claims found that compensation payments, although reasonable in amount, "necessarily" contained disguised dividends. The court presumed that
dividends were being hidden because the corporation had been profitable yet had not
paid any dividends since it was incorporated. Id. at 1339-40. The label "automatic dividend" was first applied to the McCandless case in Holden, Has Court of Claims
Adopted an "Automatic Dividend" Rule in Compensation Cases? 32 J. TAX 331 (1970).
The term implies application beyond the facts of McCandless.
3. The court reviewed the Tax Court's definition and application of the factors that
determine reasonable compensation. The court reversed the finding that the compensation received was intended to distribute profits and remanded the case for reconsideration under the analysis outlined in the opinion. 716 F.2d at 1248.
4. Id. at 1242. The corporation experienced gross sales of $500,000 in 1952 when it
was originally incorporated and expanded to gross sales of over 5 million dollars with 40
employees in 1975. Id.
5. Id. His duties included total managerial responsibility, the making of ultimate
policy decisions, the roles of sales and credit manager and decision making for the parts
and service departments. Elliot worked an average of 80 hours per week. Id.

171

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10

172

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:171

profitable,8 never paid a dividend. 7
The corporation had paid Elliot a base salary of $2000 per
month for several years, including the years 1975 and 1976
which were the years questioned in the IRS's notice of deficiency.8 In addition, Elliot received bonuses equivalent to fifty
percent of the corporation's net profits before deduction of income taxes and management bonuses. 9 The bonuses were based
on a predetermined formula, consistently applied since the time
of incorporation. 1o
6. Elliots Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C.M.(CCH) 802, 804 (1980), reu'd 716 F.2d 1241 (9th
Cir. 1983). Elliots Inc.'s net profits were as follows:
After Tax Profits
Fiscal Year Ending
Net Profits·
February 28
1968.
.... $ 25,090 ......... , . .... $19,715
4,206
5,635.
1969.
19,190
1970 ................. .
27,042 ........... .
43,934
77,569.
1971 ..
36,713
59,873 ............ .
1972.
37,268
1973.
57,951. .......... .
63,674
1974.
112,536 ........... .
88,969
157,074 .......... .
1975.
98,297
169,663 .......... .
1976.
78,250
1977.
129,696.
42,860
59,052 .......... .
1978 ..
·After salary to Mr. Elliot and before State and Federal Income Taxes.
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 804.
7. 716 F.2d at 1247.
8. [d. at 1242.
9. [d. Mr. Elliot was paid as president and general manager of Elliots Inc. as follows:
Fiscal Year Ending
February 28
1968 ..
1969 ..
1970.
1971 .. .
1972 ......... .
1973 ..
1974.
1975 ..
1976.
1977 ..
1978 ..

Total Compensation
Paid to Mr. Elliott
. ..... $ 42,800
19,600
34,035
84,450
68,323
66,401
136,536
181,074
193,663
153,696
83,052

40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 804.
10. [d. The ability to show that contingent compensation is based on a formula, that
has been in effect for an extended period of time, is important and good record keeping
can make the difference. The crucial issue seems to be that the system was predeter-
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The corporation deducted $181,074 and $191,633 as compensation paid to Elliot for the fiscal years ending in 1975 and
1976 respectively.ll However, the Internal Revenue Service issued a notice of deficiency and limited the deduction to $65,000
for each fiscal year.I2 The corporation petitioned the Tax Court
for a redetermination of liability and subsequently the deficiency was reduced. Ho~ever, the court determined that the
payments to the employee-shareholder were both compensation
for personal services and disguised dividends and concluded that
the total amount paid was in excess of reasonable compensation. I3 The corporation appealed the Tax Court's holding regarding the level of reasonable compensation to the Ninth Circuit,
contending that the court ignored the amount of compensation
mined and the inference that the method is being put forward only as a result of litigation should be avoided. The Ninth Circuit advanced such a perspective in Pacific Grains
v. Comm'r, 399 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1968):
The failure of the taxpayer's Board of Directors to earmark
the funds as being in part for prior services and the lack of
any showing as to what percentage of the compensation was
intended for the respective periods give support to the Commissioner's contention that the taxpayer's theory of compensation for prior services was only an afterthought developed at a
time when the reasonableness of the compensation was already under attack.
399 F.2d at 606.
11. 716 F.2d at 1242.
12. [d. The Commissioner's notice of deficiency contained the following explanation:
It is determined that compensation paid to Edward G. Elliot
during the taxable years ended 2/28/75 and 2/28/76 is excessive in amounts of $116,073.71 and 128,662.91, respectively.
Such amounts exceed a reasonable allowance for salaries and
other compensation for personal services rendered within the
ambit of section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 809.
13. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813. The Tax Court did not allow the fact that Elliot's compensation was based on a contingent formula to enter into their analysis:
Based on the record as a whole, and considering (1) the nature
of the work done by Mr. Elliot, (2) the hours he worked, (3)
the lack of difference in his work in the years here in issue and
prior years, (4) the fact that in many instances salaries paid by
other John Deere dealers were paid to more than one individual, and (5) the level of salaries paid by petitioner to executive
employees other than Mr. Elliot, we conclude that reasonable
compensation for petitioner's fiscal years ending February 28,
1975 and February 28, 1976 was $120,000 and $125,000 respectively. We therefore sustain respondent's disallowance of petitioner's claimed deduction for compensation paid to Mr. Elliot
which is in excess of these amounts.
[d.
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paid to Elliot in prior and succeeding years under the formula. 14
II. BACKGROUND
Section 162(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows reasonable compensation payments but not dividend payments to
be de4ucted as ordinary and necessary business expenses by corporations. 11I Because dividends are includable in the gross income of the recipient and also as corporate distributions out of
current or accumulated earnings and profits, an incentive exists
for labeling the payments as compensation to avoid a double tax
on the distribution. IS However, shareholder-employees are taxed
at the same level for both dividends and wages regardless of the
payment's characterization. 17 Yet, officer-shareholders with significant holdings may prefer to receive dividends in the guise of
compensation in order to further the interests of the corporation
and their own interests as shareholders.
14. 716 F.2d at 1242. See also Brief for Appellant at 4, 716 F.2d 1241.
15. I.R.C. § 162(a)(I)(West 1978). The section provides:
"(a) In general.- There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including. (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. . . ." [d.
The issue in most cases is "what is reasonable?" Although subordinate to the Internal Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations can be looked to for interpretive aid. The
regulation illustrates practical application of the code:
In any event the allowance for the compensation paid may not
exceed what is reasonable under all the circumstances. It is, in
general, just to assume that reasonable and true compensation
is only such amount as would ordinarily be paid for like services under like circumstances. The circumstances to be taken
into consideration are those existing at the date when the contract for services was made, not those existing at the date
when the contract is questioned.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658. Further interpretation of the
Treasury Regulation is found in judicial interpretation of what constitutes "like services
under like circumstances." This is essentially a fact question.
16. I.R.C. § 316(a) and § 301(c)(I)(West 1978).
17. 716 F.2d at 1243 n.2.
Moreover, for payments made between 1971 and 1981, as is
the case here, a high income recipient has a strong incentive to
characterize such payments as compensation rather than dividends: pre·1982 dividends are taxable at a maximum rate of
70% while the maximum tax rate for wages received between
1971 and 1981 is 50%. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (amended 1983) and §
1348 (repealed 1981). (Since 1982, the maximum tax rate for
both wages and dividends has been 50%. 26 U.S.C. § 1
(1982».
[d.
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. The determination of reasonable compensation has followed
the two prong test contained in Treasury Regulation section
1.162-7(a).18 Under the first prong of this test, it is necessary to
determine if the amount of compensation is reasonable. 19 Although the interpretation by courts as to what is reasonable has
varied from case to case, several guidelines are important in
making the reasonableness interpretation. 20 These include the
employee's qualifications, the nature of the position, complexities of the business and industry customs and economic conditions in general. 21
18. "The test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they
are reasonable and are in fact payments purely for services." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(a),
T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 657.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3), T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658. An example of the approach utilizing the amount paid as a gauge of reasonableness is found in Klamath Med.
Servo Bureau V. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1959)(the corporation sold prepaid medical plans and contracted to pay physicians for their services according to a schedule of
base fees under a complex formula.):
The Tax Court specifically found that while the fee schedule
was unreasonably low when compared to like services and procedures and compensation charged therefor by physicians in
private practice, it was equitable and fair when the lessened
costs to doctors rendering services under the plan (which lessened costs are attributable to taxpayer's operation) were considered. None of the fees set were unreasonable in amount,
and it was held that 100 percent of the billings of physicians
constituted reasonable compensation for the services for which
taxpayer was billed.
[d. at 844.
20. Miller Mfg. CO. V. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1945). "These facts and circumstances vary so widely that each corporate tub must more or less stand upon its own
bottom." [d. at 423.
21. A much cited summary of factors to be considered is found in Mayson Mfg. CO.
V. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949):
[lIt is well settled that several basic factors should be considered by the Court in reaching its decision in any particular
case. Such factors include the employee's qualifications; the
nature, extent and scope of the employee's work; the size and
complexities of the business; a comparison of salaries paid
with the gross income and the net income; the prevailing general economic conditions; comparison of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for
comparable positions in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees; and in the case of
small corporations with a limited number of officers, the
amount of compensation paid to the particular employee in
previous years.
[d. at 119. The Court of Claims laid out a set of guidelines in Irby Constr. CO. V. United
States, 290 F.2d 824 (1961):
The inquiry as to the reasonableness of compensation in a
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The second prong analyzes whether the payments were
made "purely for services."22 It examines "intent" in specific situations where the compensation was paid to persons with what
appear to be less than arms-length relationships, such as family
members or employee-shareholders. 23 However, the lack of divigiven instance is not without some guides. At various times
courts have looked to such things as the amounts paid by similar enterprises for services of a like character; the type and
extent of services rendered by the employee; the scarcity of
qualified employees for the position; the prior earning capacity
of the employee; the peculiar characteristics of the taxpayer's
business, and the general economic conditions of the period.
[d. at 826.

22. Payments in excess of 100% of the amount agreed upon by contract have been
disallowed as distributions of corporate income. Klamath, 261 F.2d at 845. In Klamath
Med.Serv. Bureau v. Comm'r, 29 T.C. 339 (1957),aff'd 261 F.2d at 845, the Tax Court
examined whether the payments were purely for services as follows:
We think it must be concluded from this record that, with respect to that portion of the payments here involved which exceeds 100 per cent of the billings of petitioner's staff doctors,
such payments were distributions of petitioner's profits and
earnings. We are led to this conclusion because of the contract
under which petitioner was bound to pay its member doctors
for their services rendered. That instrument is ambiguous with
respect to the compensation for such services. It does not specifically provide for the payment of over 100 per cent of the
billings for such services but does provide specifically that the
billings be in accordance with its fee schedule.... It seems
clear from this that petitioner has contracted with its member
physicians that they will render their services to petitioner for
fees equal to its fee schedule regardless of the fact that such
fees may be in some instances below reasonable compensation
therefor.
29 T.C. at 347-48.
Another indicator that the payment is not "purely for services" is that the only
employees receiving bonuses are employee-stockholders and the bonuses received are in
proportion to their holdings:
Each of the bonus payments and administrative salary payments made by Nor-Cal to its four officer-shareholders during
the year in issue was exactly proportionate to the recipient's
respective stockholding in Nor-Cal. Taxpayer also employed
three other insurance adjusters during 1967 but none of those
individuals received bonuses in any way comparable to the officer-shareholders.
Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm'r, 503 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. In Nor-Cal, the factors that were determinative in finding that the compensation at issue was not payment for services actually rendered were:
1. The bonuses were in exact proportion to the officer's
stockholdings;
2. Payments were in lump sums rather than as the services
were rendered;
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dends in and of itself was not indicative of a disguised dividend
until McCandless Tile Service v. Commissioner.Z4
In McCandless, the Court of Claims211 held that the amounts
3. There was a complete absence of formal dividend distributions by an expanding corporation;
4. The system of bonuses were completely unstructured; i.e.,
bonuses were computed periodically throughout the year on
no apparent pre-set basis;
5. Taxpayers consistently negligible taxable income was an indication that the bonus system was based on funds available
rather than services rendered;
6. The stock redemption agreement between Nor-Cal and
Hobson [Hobson was president of Nor-Cal and a 35% shareholder.l; and
7. Bonus payments were made only to the officer-stockholders.
503 F.2d at 362.
24. 422 F.2d at 1339. See Bringwald, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 639 (Ct.CI.
1964). "Certainly the mere fact that a corporation has never paid any dividend would
not, in and of itself, justify the conclusion that the salaries paid to an employee shareholder were a distribution of a dividend. There may be varied business reasons for the
corporation to refrain from distributing dividends." [d. at 644.
25. There are three forums available to the taxpayer who wishes to fight a notice of
deficiency: the Tax Court of the United States, the United States district courts and the
United States Court of Claims. There are no jurisdictional requirements or limitations as
to the amount in controversy for any of the three courts. The district courts and Court of
Claims handle any federal tax assessment issues. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is limited
to cases involving income, estate, gift and excess profit taxes. The most important difference is that the taxpayer must pay the disputed tax in full before an action maybe
brought in the Court of Claims or the district court. A jury trial is available only in the
district court. L. PONDER, UNITED STATES TAX COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 24-27
(1976).
The Tax Court views itself as a national court. Originally this attitude was reflected
in Arthur L. Lawrence v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 713, 716-20(1957), rev'd 258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1958), overruled, 54 T.C. 742, 757(1970):
The Tax Court has always believed that Congress intended it to decide all cases uniformly, regardless of where, in
its nation-wide jurisdiction, they may arise, and that it could
not perform its assigned functions properly were it to decide
one case one way and another differently merely because appeals in such cases might go to the different Courts of
Appeals....
27 T.C. at 718.
That viewpoint was modified in Jack E. Golsen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970):
Notwithstanding a number of the considerations which
originally led us to that decision [Lawrencel, it is our best
judgment that better judicial administration. [sicl (footnote
ommitted) requires us to follow a Court of Appeals decision
which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies
to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone (footnote
ommitted).
[d. The taxpayer must examine the precedent in the courts of appeals in the circuit in
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paid as compensation, although reasonable, contained a disguised dividend 26 because the corporation had not declared any
dividends since its formation.27 Two fifty-percent officer shareholders were paid compensation equal to fifty-percent of the corporation's net profits. 28 The court recognized the outstanding
management ability of the two employee-stockholders and conceded that the corporation's success and large profits were attributable to their hard work and dedication. 2s The unique rewhich the case may be brought. These prior decisions will be influential to a varying
degree depending on the court chosen. The district courts pay close attention to the
views of the higher federal courts. The Court of Claims has overruled itself on more than
one occassion and so may rule favorably despite a prior adverse decision. B. LANE AND J.
HAMOVIT. THE PREPARATION OF TAX REFUND CASES IN THE DISTRICT COURTS AND COURT
OF CLAIMS. 12-25 (1964). A Court of Claims decision, such as McCandless, could only be
appealed to the Supreme Court at the time the Elliots litigation was initiated. However,
decisions of all three courts can be appealed to courts of appeals now, which will alter
some of the precedential value of future decisions of the various courts.
26. Based on an examination of the entire record, the court determined that there
should have been a 15% return on equity capital. This figure was based on net profits
before salaries and federal income tax. The court concluded that this 15% return had
been distributed via the compensation payments. 422 F.2d at 1340.
27. The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Pacific Grains. The court made
the following observations regarding profitability and dividends:
The taxpayer notes that the business was doing well with a
high rate of return on the investment. This success certainly
presents an argument that high salaries might be justified.
However, it is also consistent with the Commissioner's argument that the taxpayer should have been paying dividends
and that the high salary paid to its sole shareholder was
merely a method of draining off corporate profits at a tax
advantage.
399 F.2d at 606. The court decided that "[r)ather than declare dividends, the Board paid
him a high salary." [d. at 607. The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Elliot radically alters this
"either-or" approach. 716 F.2d at 1246.
28. The court stated that there was some indication, based on review of a "comparable company," that the McCandlesses were entitled to greater compensation. 422 F.2d at
1339.
29. [d. The court reasoned as follows:
There can be little doubt on the record here that plaintiff's
impressive net profit showing during the years in question has
been due in large measure to the long experience, outstanding
executive abilities, and hard work of Charles S. and Charles L.
McCandless. The evidence is persuasive, moreover, that it
would be extremely difficult for plaintiff to replace these two
officers within any reasonable period of time. In short, the McCandlesses have placed [sic) a critical role in, and are largely
responsible for, plaintiff's extremely successful operations.
[d. The McCandless court also attributed the success of the company to the shareholder
roles: "supplying risk capital, assuming corporate obligations and participating in corporate decisions." [d. at 1340. This focus may be responsible for the unique result in McCandless. After all, the shareholder-employee is entitled to wages as an employee, which
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suIt of this case turned on the emphasis the court gave to the
lack of dividends. so However, McCandless has been the subject
of much criticism regarding the application of the "automatic
dividend" rule. sl
The McCandless court applied the language of section
1.162-7(b)(1) of the Treasury Regulations s2 which cautions that
where salaries are not r~asonable in comparison to those of similar businesses and the payments correspond to the percentage of
are an immediate return on time devoted to the job. He is also entitled to a return on his
investment as a shareholder but it may not always be in his best interest to receive an
immediate return as a dividend. He may prefer, if given the choice, to reinvest profits
and gain a larger future return. The McCandless case, strictly interpreted, requires that
the compensation reflect a return on both roles if no dividends are paid. If the compensation was found to be in excess of reasonable, the labeling of the excess as a disguised
dividend would not cut into the amount determined to be reasonable for the employee
role. However, a less equitable result is obtained if the amount is determined to be reasonable and therefore the mandatory dividend has to be supplied by subtracting it from
the reasonable compensation for the employee role. This results in a sacrifice of the compensation for the employee role to satisfy the shareholder role. This approach is tentative at best when the amount of influence that a shareholder has on the success of a
corporation is examined.
The shareholder's role generally includes voting for directors and investing money
but not direct responsibility for fine tuning an organization. One commentator has
pointed out that "[ilt is difficult to accept the argument that the stockholders were responsible for the success of the company and shol,lld be compensated therefore as a result of their participation in corporate decisions. Stockholders as such are compensated
for the use of their money." O'Neill, Reasonable, but Nondeductible, "Compensation"?
57 A.B.A.J. 82, 84 (1971). The segregation of the distinct roles of investor-shareholder
and officer-employee is even more important in a sole shareholder case such as Elliots.
30. "We think it clear that any return on equity capital is so conspicuous by its
absence as to indicate, given all the facts, that the purported compensation payments
necessarily contained a distribution of corporate earnings within." 422 F.2d at 1339-40.
31. Coggin, The Status of the McCandless Doctrine, 55 TAXES 720 (1976); Walthall,
McCandless-Implications for Compensation Planning and Dividend Policy, 6 CUM. L.
REV. 1 (1975); Note, Reasonable Compensation, 26 STAN. L. REV. 441 (1973).
32. The Treasury Regulation states in part:
Any amount paid in the form of compensation, but not in fact
as the purchase price of services, is not deductible. An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of a
dividend on stock. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few shareholders, practically all of whom draw
salaries. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those
ordinarily paid for similar services and the excessive payments
correspond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of
the officers or employees, it would seem likely (emphasis
added) that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered, but that the excessive (emphasis added) payments are
a distribution of earnings on the stock.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1).
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stockholdings, it is "likely" that the "excessive" compensation is
a disguised dividend. 88 The court focused on the lack of dividends and ignored their finding that the compensation was reasonable. Despite the lack of "excessive" payments, their scrutiny
uncovered disguised dividends. 84 McCandless has been frequently cited by the government81i in disguised dividend cases
for various propositions, however, no court has automatically applied the rule as was done in McCandless. 86
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of contingent
compensation and a lack of dividends in Nor-Cal Adjusters v.
Commissioner.87 Significantly, the court did not cite McCand33. 422 F.2d at 1339.
34. 1d. at 1340.
Implicit in our earlier discussion of reasonable compensation is the attitude that a corporation's highly efficient operation and its clearly demonstrated profit-making ability justify
substantial compensation to the officers responsible therefore.
As such performance justifies substantial compensation, we
are of the further view that it also justifies a substantial investment return. Perhaps this is especially true with respect to
a closely held corporation where the opportunity to distribute
corporate earnings as compensation is most readily available
and, as here, compensation is in fact in proportion to the
stockholdings of the principle stockholders.
1d.

35. In Elliots, the government utilized McCandless for both the proposition that the
lack of dividends was strong evidence in favor of a finding of disguised dividends and
that 15% of the company profits were dividends, not compensation. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at
810. However, the Commissioner dropped the 15% figure in the brief for the appeal to
the Ninth Circuit. "A substantial return on investment for stockholders would ordinarily
be expected from such successful operations and the absence of a profit distribution to
stockholder justifies the inference that some of the purported compensation really represents a distribution of taxpayer's profits." Brief for Appellee at 28, Elliots, 716 F.2d
1241. Notice the similarity to the language in McCandless. See supra note 34.
36. The lack of dividends paid by a group of profitable companies was taken as an
inference that the compensation contained a partial distribution of profits. Charles
Schneider and Co. v. Comm'r, 500 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1974). The Schneider court cited
McCandless for this proposition but did not automatically conclude that part of the
compensation was not purely for services on that basis alone. The court pointed out that
the contingent bonuses based on percentages of annual net sales and profits left little to
be paid out as dividends even though the companies were profitable. The fact that the
employee-shareholder spent less time at work and his pay increased during that period
was also seen as significant. Comparisons made to prevailing rates paid to persons in
similar positions within the furniture and upholstery manufacturing industry showed the
compensation to be grossly disproportionate to similar sized companies. The bonuses
were two to three times what was paid in the industry. In this factual setting, the lack of
dividends was indicative of disguised dividends, but not controlling. 500 F.2d at 153-54.
37. 503 F.2d at 361. Nor-Cal involved contingent bonuses to officer-shareholders in
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less, although the Tax Court opini~n which was affirmed did refer to the case. 88

In Nor-Cal, the Tax Court cited McCandless for the proposition that the compensation, though reasonable, could still
contain a disguised dividend. 89 The Ninth Circuit gave cursory
treatment to the Tax Court's findings and affirmed the decision. 40 The Ninth Circuit's language41 closely resembled a McCandless analysis. 42
In Edwins, Inc. v. United States,48 the Seventh Circuit relegated the importance of the lack of dividends to that of a "red
flag" and stressed that it was only one factor in determining reasonable compensation. 44 This treatment of the automatic dividend rule curbed the effects of McCandless as precedent although it did not expressly reject the rule.
In Giles Industries v. United States!" the Court of Claims
exact proportion to stockholdings and no dividends were paid. The lack of dividends was
not given overriding significance in the reasonableness determination and the bonU8es
paid in proportion to the stockholdings were given equal emphasis. 1d. at 361-62.
38. Nor-Cal Adjusters v. Comm'r, 30 T.C.M.(CCH) 837,842 (1971), aff'd 503 F.2d
359 (9th Cir. 1974).
39. 30 T.C.M.(CCH) at 841.
40. 503 F.2d at 361.
41. See supra note 22, Nor-Cal. However, in the Elliots case, the commissioner
presented the proposition that because Elliot was the sole shareholder, there could be no
arms-length agreement regarding a percentage of profits bonU8. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810.
This same argument was put forth on appeal. Brief for Appellee at 26, 716 F.2d 1241.
Additionally, the McCandless case was used for the proposition that the lack of dividends is strong evidence of disguised dividends. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810. On appeal, this
assertion was still made by the commissioner. Brief for Appellee at 28, 716 F.2d 1241.
The commissioner contended that at least 15% of the earnings and profits must be disguised dividends,based on the McCandless formula. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 810. The 15%
estimate was dropped on appeal. These three contentions can be made without analyzing
the facts of a case beyond noticing that the corporation has a sole-shareholder employee
paid on a contingent basis and that no dividends are paid.
42. "Bonuses had been paid to taxpayer's officer-shareholders in every year of its
existence through the year in question. From the time appellant was originally incorporated to the filing of this action, Nor-Cal has neither formally declared nor paid a dividend to any of its shaIeholders." 1d. The avoidance of a citation to McCandless could
have been premised on the fact that because the bonuses were so obviously tied to the
proportion of stockholdings, the court had no need to formally address the lack of dividends in the McCandless sense.
43. 501 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1974). In Edwins, two fifty-percent officer-shareholders
each received a twenty percent bonus from net income before taxes. 1d. at 676.
44. 1d. at 677 n.5. The court did not directly reject McCandless by name. 1d. at 678.
45. 496 F.2d 556 (Ct.CI. 1974). In Giles, the two fifty-percent employee-shareholders
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modified its subsequent application of the McCandless holding
and exmphasized that in order to apply the automatic dividend
rule, the facts must parallel those in McCandless."8 The court
went so far as to outline specific factors necessary for the application of the automatic dividend rule."7

III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In rejecting the McCandless automatic dividend rule, the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the government's argument that because the profitable corporation had never paid a dividend to
the shareholder-officer, part of the compensation must be considered a disguised dividend.
The court rejected McCandless for three major reasons.
First, there is no statute which requires profitable corporations
to pay dividends. 48 This is an acknowledgment that the distribution of dividends is not mandatory and that Congress intended
that excessive profits accumulated under such circumstances are
to be dealt with via the accumulated earnings tax."9
received compensation equal to fifty percent of the net profits before taxes.
46. [d. at 567-68. See Coggin, The Status of the McCandless Doctrine, 55 TAXES
720 (1976).
47. 496 F.2d at 567-68. As presented by one commentator:
These distinguishing factors may be briefly summarized as
follows:
1. The presence of dividend payments in any year;
2. Certain of the stockholders are not in fact officers of the
corporation;
3. Compensation paid to the stockholder-officers is not proportional to their respective stockholdings.
4. Divergence in the shareholdings between the officer-shareholders and;
5. Compensation paid to stockholder-officers amount to less
than 50% of the corporation's net profits (before their compensation and federal income tax).
Coggin, supra note 46 at 731.
48. 716 F.2d at 1244.
49. 26 I.R.C. § 531-37 (West 1978).
532(a) General rule- The accumulated earnings tax imposed
by section 531 shall apply to every corporation (other than
th08e described in subsection (b)) formed or availed of for the
purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed. [d. at 532(a). 533(a)- Unreasonable
accumulation determinative of purpose- For purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation
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Secondly, the court labeled the premise that the shareholders of a profitable corporation will demand dividends to be
faulty. The court noted that a corporation has the right to reinvest profits if shareholders prefer to realize investment returns
through appreciation. 50
Lastly, the court stated that it may be in the best interest of
a closely held corporation to maintain a conservative dividend
policy because retention and reinvestment may be the most reasonable source of financing and credit due to limited access to
capital. 5l
Next, the court addressed application of the two prong analysis of reasonableness and compensatory purpose. 52 The court
explained that where the evidence shows a failure to pay a dividend, but no other evidence of intent to hide dividends in compensation, the focus of the inquiry will be limited to reasonableness under the first prong. 53 Such an inquiry can be based on an
objective standard by examining salaries paid for comparable
positions in similar corporations.1!4
The court acknowledged the difficulty of establishing proof
of intent for the second prong. A subjective analysis is required
to determine whether there was a compensatory purpose. To cirare permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of
the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the
income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the
contrary.
[d. at 533(a).
50. 716 F.2d at 1244. It is interesting to note that under the McCandless doctrine,
profit reflects the ability to pay a dividend and the lack oC one indicates a disguised
distribution. However, from a different perspective, profit can be viewed as a positive
factor in showing that the compensation scheme has not depleted the capital to the point
where no dividend could be paid. This perspective will still closely scrutinize compensation that appears to be depleting all the profits at a tax advantage. See Nor-Cal, 503
F.2d 359. This divergence in approach and reasoning is based in a difference in assumptions as to what an independent investor would consider to be reasonable. The McCandless doctrine concludes that all investors want the maximum dividends payable. The
instant opinion reflects a more flexible approach which takes into account the need Cor a
small business to reserve capital as well as produce sufficient earnings on equity. See
Note, supra note 31.
51. 716 F.2d at 1244. See Walthall, supra note 31.
52. 716 F.2d at 1244. See supra note 18.
53. 716 F.2d at 1244.
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(1). See supra note 32.
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cumvent this difficulty, the court declared that intent can be inferred if the amount is first determined to be reasonable under
the first prong. 1I1I The court noted that, to a great extent, this
approach avoids scrutiny of subjective intent.
The court noted that by allowing the first prong of the te.st
to subsume the second prong, the analysis will scrutinize compensatory intent secondarily and only if there is evidence that
an otherwise reasonable amount contains a disguised dividend.
Such evidence will be the exception and' not the rule. 1I8
The court stated that the analysis of whether the compensation was reasonable should be considered from the perspective
of an independent investor.1I7 The question is whether such an
investor would be willing to compensate the employee in like
fashion. The factors to be considered were the nature and quality of the services and the effect of the services on the investor's
return and the corporation's profits. liS
Under the Elliots analysis, the employee's role as shareholder and the nonpayment of dividends are to be viewed as
only two of the many factors to be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of compensation. The court recognized the difficulty inherent in distinguishing between dividends and the compensation received by employee-shareholders of a closely held
corporation due to the lack of "arms-length" dealing. 1I9 Because
55. 716 F.2d at 1243.
56. See Nor-Cal, 503 F.2d 359. See also Klamath Med. Servo Bureau, 261 F.2d 842.
The Ninth Circuit's approach gives equal weight to all factors which contribute to the
reasonableness analysis and completely rejects the automatic dividend rule which examines compensatory intent first and allows the lack of dividends to overrule even a finding
of reasonable compensation. Under the court's analysis, any compensation which is
found to be reasonable will have its compensatory intent inferred with the exception of
"rare" cases where there is evidence of a disguised dividend.
57. 716 F.2d at 1247.
58. [d. at 1245.
59. Due to the very nature of close corporations, they seem to attract more than
their fair share of litigation. As one commentator explains:
As a practical matter, the question of deductibility of
amounts paid to stockholder-employees only arises in the context of the closely held corporation. There is no statutory authority for a differentiation in tax treatment between the
closely-held corporation (with only a few stockholders, in
which all or most of the stockholders serve a8 officers and employees of the corporation) and the publicly-held corporation
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the sole shareholder-officer would be the sole recipient of dividends, the observation that compensation is in proportion to
ownership interest is meaningless. 60 Other evidence must be present to press the examination beyond that of reasonable compensation and into compensatory intent.
The Elliots court examined the question of whether the
payments to Elliot were for his role as employee-officer or shareholder. 61 The analysis focused on the reasonableness of compensation payments as a whole under all the factors and circumstances. 62 The court organized the inquiry into five broad
(with its stock traded over the counter or on one of the national or regional exchanges). However, salary and bonus payments to stockholder-employees of closely held corporations
are said to be subject to special scrutiny because of the lack of
an "arms-length" relationship between the employee and his
corporate employer. Harolds Club v. Comm'r, 340 F.2d 861
(9th Cir. 1965). In reality, it is reasonable to believe that chief
executive officers of a large publicly-held corporation, whose
stock is widely distributed among a large number of investors,
with no single dominant stockholder or group of stockholders,
do not bargain at "arms-length" for their compensation. In
such a situation, it is generally recognized that management is
in control of the proxy machinery which elects the board of
directors, and thus is nominally subservient to the directors so
elected.
See A. BERLE AND G. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66-69
(rev. ed. 1967); Walthall, supra note 31 at 1 n.1.
60. All payments to a sole shareholder are in proportion to his stockholdings. Therefore, the use of compensation payments which are in proportion to stock ownership as
part of the test for hidden dividends would always be indicative of di,sguised dividends
wher~ none had been distributed. Prior to the Elliots decision, that factor was used in
conjunction with a lack of dividends as an indicator on noncompensatory intent. See
Schneider, 500 F.2d at 153, and Pacific Grains, 399 F.2d at 605-606. The Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Elliots has removed a troublesome step from the reasonableness analysis.
61. See note 29 supra. The question in Elliots as to whether the payments were for
the role of employee-officer or shareholder appears to be another way of asking if the
payments were dividends or compensation. The underlying assumption is that if the conclusion reached is that the payments were for the employee role, they must be compensation. The simple converse of this is that if they are not for the employee role, they
must therefore be for the shareholder role and thus dividends. The next assumption in
this approach is that if the payments were for the employee role but were in excess of a
reasonable amount then the excess must be for the shareholder role and thus dividends.
This approach avoids the McCandless result where payments which are reasonable could
be attributed to the shareholder role since it allocates the compensation for the employee
role first and the excess to the shareholder.
62. An objective viewpoint is taken in this analysis. This alleviates the scrutiny of
subjective intent as a primary focus unless evidence points to a specific intent. Even the
assumption that payments in excess of what is reasonable for the employee role should
be considered as payments to the shareholder role may be modified in light of some
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categories of factors that were to be given equal weight.
The first category was the employee's role in the company.6S
The court noted that the Tax Court's findings that Elliot
worked 80 hours per week to be an "appropriate consideration."6. However, the court questioned the Tax Court's characterization of Elliot's qualifications as a "capable executive" with
"no special expertise."611 After examining the record, the court
pointed out that the Tax Court should reconsider Elliot's "extreme personal dedication and devotion to his work" and to
what extent an independent investor would be willing to compensate him.66
The second category, which the court labeled "external
compensation" was the comparison of the employee's salary to
salaries paid by similar companies for like services. The court
condoned the Tax Court's comparison of Elliot's compensation
to that of managers at other John Deere dealers.67 The comparifactors or circumstances such as the economy or the fluctuations of contingent salaries.
716 F.2d at 1246-48.
63. The court relied on American Foundry v. Comm'r, 536 F.2d 289, 291-292 (9th
Cir. 1976). The court looked at the position held, the hours worked, the duties performed
and the general importance of the employee to the success of the company. 716 F.2d at
1245.
64. 716 F.2d at 1245-46.
65. 1d. at 1246. Elliot had a degree in Political Science and ran his own company,
yet the Tax Court felt there was nothing in the record demonstrating any special expertise. 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813.
66. 716 F.2d at 1246. The viewpoint of the independent investor avoids the difficult
subjective analysis of the compensatory intent test. A similar analysis was used in Carole
Accessories v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M.(CCH) 285 (1973)(citing Hecht v. United States, 54
F.2d 968 (Ct.CI. 1932)). The case referred to the "unrelated employer." 32 T.C.M.(CCH)
at 1289.
67. The relative size of the concerns being compared should also be taken into consideration. A salary will be found reasonable as long as "[ilt compares favorably with
salaries shown to have been paid that year to heads of kindred industrial concerns whose
total earnings were much greater." Hoffman Radio Corp. v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 264, 266
(9th Cir. 1949). When a comparison is made to another company for the purpose of
determining reasonableness, it is important to compare the profits and not the gross
sales. The Ninth Circuit addressed this point in Wagner and Son, Inc. v. Comm'r, 93
F.2d 816 (1937) when they stated:
Petitioner introduced no evidence to show the salaries paid by
other concerns in similar circumstances. Although petitioner
shows the amount of its sales for the years prior to 1929, it
does not show the amount of profit for those years. Obviously,
a large amount of sales does not alone justify a particular salary, for those sales may have been at a figure below cost.
1d. at 819.
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son was made on the basis of the multiple serVIces that Elliot
had provided to the company.66
The third category involved the character and condition of
the company. This focused on the company's size as indicated
by its sales, net income and capital value69 as well as the complexities of the business and the general economic conditions. 70
The court agreed with the Tax Court's consideration of these
68. Elliot did the work of two or three persons at other John Deere dealers and so
the appropriate comparison was to multiple salaries. 716 F.2d at 1246. See supra note 5.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3).
69. In General Water Heater Corp. v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 419 (1930), the Ninth Circuit
looked at the ability to pay dividends as negating the inference created by no dividends
actually being paid. "It is contended that it was reasonable to pay these salaries because
after their payment there was left sufficient income to pay 7.5 per cent. [sic] on the
invested capital for the year 1921, and 9.6 per cent. [sic] for the year 1922." [d. at 420.
Yet the requirement that a certain amount exist for potential distribution as a dividend
is not far removed from the requirement that the dividends actually be distributed because the policy still invades the realm that should be reserved as a business decision.
The evaluation of the appropriate rate of return on an investment and the timing of
withdrawal of profits from a corporation are both business decisions. See O'Neill, supra
note 29, at 84. If the existence of dividends becomes a focus instead of a factor, then not
only does the payment of a dividend come into consideration but the amount of the
dividend would be open to scrutiny. Widespread use of the doctrine would shift the principal focus of reasonable compensation disputes away from an evaluation of amounts
paid and services performed to an examination of the return on equity capital. Instead of
evaluating the payments in relation to the work performed by the employees, courts
would be evaluating the payments in terms of the return that these employees are entitled to as shareholders. Besides being a further digression from the Code provisions, this
would impose an additional burden on the owners of closely held corporations. Investment decisions in a free society are made for a myriad of reasons, and the anticipated
and actual return on such investments varies concomitantly. The McCandless doctrine
penalizes the shareholder investor for any decision which deviate from the norm established by the court. This interference by the judiciary would result in rigidities pertinent
to only one business form, thus reducing the value to society of the closely-held corporation. Vondran, Updating the McCandless Doctrine: Taxing of Reasonable Compensation Paid by Closely-Held Corporations, 12 J. MAR. L. PRAC. & PROC. 113, 132 (1978).
70. Since the amounts paid under contingent compensation may be calculated based
on profits and profits are affected by economic conditions, such fluctuations have been
considered by the courts as a relevant factor.
On the factual side, there is no denying that petitioner's situation had by 1943 ch"nged radically because of the unanticipated advent of the war. The Court found that the unusually
large amount of business done that year was attributable in
the main, not to services rendered by Hoffman, but to war
conditions making for abnormal earnings.
Hoffman, 177 F.2d at 266. Another example of a condition that will affect earnings of a
number of industries is a fluctuating market price. "External conditions, specifically the
Russian wheat sale, resulted in a high market price for grain during part of the period at
issue." M & K Farms, Inc. v. United States, 556 F. Supp. 50, 51 (D. Montana, 1982).
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factors and did not engage in any further analysis. 71
The fourth category focused on factors which indicate conflict of interest.72 The court reasoned that where a relationship 78
exists between the corporation H and the employee which would
permit the disguise of dividends as compensation, a close examination of the situation is warranted. The court reiterated that
the compensation should be examined from the perspective of
the hypothetical independent shareholder who would be concerned with the amount of profits that would be left after the
compensation was paid. 711 As long as a reasonable return was
71. 716 F.2d at 1246. The Tax Court considered numerous charts detailing data pertaining to other John Deere dealers but comparison was difficult because the other dealerships serviced different sized territories and only two others sold both agricultural and
industrial equipment as Elliots Inc. did. The Tax Court did address the effect of economic conditions:
Also, we have noted that, compared with other years, all John
Deere agricultural dealers in the area in which petitioner operated with sales volume comparable to petitioner's had higher
profits than in any other year for which we have statistics, indicating that economic conditions substantially contributed to
the profitability of sales of agricultural equipment in that
year.
40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 813. The basic assumption is that the officer-employees role contributes to the profitability of the corporation and to his own compensation if it is based on
a contingent formula tied to profits. However, if the profits are viewed as a result of a
windfall due to economic conditions, the role of the officer-employee is nullified. It seems
illogical to attribute the profits to one simple factor or the other. During poor economic
times, any profit made may be due to the relative diligence and genius of the employee.
On the other hand, during periods of economic growth, a company that does poorly may
blame management. The better view would seem to be that profits are affected by numerous economic and personnel factors and the analysis should be conducted on both
levels.
72. Under the facts of the Elliots case, this part of the court's analysis was critical in
undermining the logic behind the McCandless rule.
73. One such relationship is where, as in the instant case, the employee is the soleshareholder. Another very common relationship if familial. "The Board of Directors authorizing the bonuses was comprised of Rodgers, his wife, and an attorney with only the
first two participating at the time of authorization." Pacific Grains, 399 F.2d at 605. It is
in situations like this that the Ninth Circuit's "independent investor" analysis lends an
objective viewpoint to a very subjective situation. 716 F.2d at 1245.
74. A closely-held corporation can be defined fiS "one in which both the management and ownership are to a substantial degree vested in a small group of persons, and
in which there is a high frequency of overlapping of the roles of shareholder, director,
and officer by these persons or members of their immediate families." Vondran, supra
note 69, at 116.
75. The assumption is that an "independent investor" would be flexible in approach
to each situation but would want to protect investments in a reasonable fashion. Compensation schemes which leave no profits may lead to an inference of a disguised dividend if an "independent investor" would object under the circumstances. An example of
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available to the investor, the court concluded that it is a good
indicator that the compensation is not a disguised dividend. The
court stated that the corporation's 20% rate of return indicated
that the corporation and Elliot were not exploiting their
relationship.76
The court looked at one more set of factors in determining
whether the payments were attributable to Elliot's role as an
employee or as a shareholder. The fifth category looked at inconsistencies in the corporation's payments to employees. The
court reasoned that existence of a "reasonable, longstanding,
consistently applied compensation plan" is evidence of reasonable compensation. 77 In the instant case, the annual bonus was
paid according to a predetermined formula of fifty-percent of
net profits over a period of twenty years. 78 The court stressed
that the reasonableness of contingent payments is to be based
on the reasonableness of the formula itself.79
The court stated that the Tax Court erred by concentrating
8uch a plan is found in Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936):
"Petitioner also contends that there was a mutual agreement contract (implied perhaps)
between the members and petitioner whereby the members were to receive all the net
profits; that because of such agreement there could be no moneys belonging to petitioner,
and therefore petitioner would have no profits." Id. at 455. An independent investor
might not find this to be a reasonable way to nurture an investment.
76. The Tax Court had limited its findings to the connection between the sole shareholder and the lack of dividends. The Ninth Circuit characterized these findings as relevant factors but pointed out that those two factors can't be used in isolation and that
any such situation requires further examination. 716 F.2d at 1246-47.
77. Id. at 1247-48. "Bonuses to employees will constitute allowable deductions from
gross income when such payments are made in good faith and as additional compensation for the services actually rendered by the employees, provided such payments, when
added to the stipulated salaries, do not exceed a reasonable compensation for the services rendered." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 T.D. 6500, 1983-15 C.B. 658.
78. It should be noted that the bonuses were not paid exclusively to Elliot. "All of
the employees of petitioner participated to some extent in these bonuses, the amount
being determined by a vote of the board of directors and not by a present [sic) formula
a8 was the case of the bonus to Mr. Elliot." 40 T.C.M.(CCH) at 805. That the bonuses
were not made exclusively to officer-shareholders negates one of the factors the Ninth
Circuit considered in Nor-Cal to determine that the compensation was not purely for
services. 503 F.2d at 362. See supra note 19.
79. 716 F.2d at 1248. In Schanchrist Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r, 77 T.C.M.(P-H) 559
(1977), the Tax Court found that the formula used was a good faith attempt to arrive at
a reasonable level of compensation. The base salary was $30,000 and 4 % of invested
capital retained for future growth. The first $10,000 net profits yielded 50 %, the next
$10,000 yielded 40%, the third $10,000, 30% and 10% of the remaining profits were
added in. [d. at 563-64.
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on the amounts paid under the formula for the two years in
question and not on the reasonableness of the formula. so The
formula in the instant case had over-compensated in some years
and undercompensated in others yet the court felt such fluctuations should not make the formula unreasonables1 if it has been
reasonable in the long run. S2 The court directed that the viewpoint should be that of an independent investor who would look
for a formula which allowed a satisfactory return on equity over
the long run. S3
80. 716 F.2d at 1248.
81. As one commentator put it, "[t)he reasonable salary test need not be met on an
annual basis but only over the whole period of employment." Ford and Page, Reasonable
Compensation: Continuous Controversy, 5 J. CORP. TAX'N 307, 315 (1979).
82. A comparison of the compensation actually paid to Elliot with that stated to
reasonable by the Tax Court shows the actual average compensation to be less than the
figure determined by the Tax Court to be a reasonable average annual income.
Fiscal Year
Ending
February 28

Consumer
Price Index
(1967 = 100.0)

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

100.00"
104.2
109.8
116.3
121.3
125.3
133.1
147.7
161.2
170.5
185.0
Total
Average

Compensation
Paid Mr.
Elliot
$

42,800
19,600
34,035
84,450
68,323
66,401
136,536
181,074
193,663[sic]
153,696
83,052

$1,063,630
$ 96,694

Reasonable
Compensation
Under Tax
Court Decision
81,246
84,658
89,208
94,489
98,551
101,801
108,138
120,000
130,9684
138,524
150,305
$1,197,888
$ 108,899
$

Difference
$ (38,446)
(65,058 [sic)
(55,173)
(10,039)
(30,228)
(35,400)
28,398
61,074
62,695
15,172
(67,253)
$(134,258)
$( 12,205)"

• The Consumer Price Index for the calendar year ending immediately prior to the end
of the respective fiscal year is used because the fiscal year ends only two months after
the close of the calendar year.
4 The increase in compensation determined by the Tax Court for the year ending February, 1975 was less than the increase in the Consumer Price Index.
" The comparison would not be significantly different if the amount of $125,000 for the
year ending February 28, 1976 was used as the base. Using the 1976 figure, the annual
average for Reasonable Compensation Under Tax Court Decision would be $103,936 or
$7,205 more than the average compensation paid to Mr. Elliot.
Brief for Appellant at 7, Elliots, 40 T.C.M.(CCH) 802. The chart utilizes $120,000 for the
fiscal year ending February 28, 1975 as determined by the Tax Court to be reasonable
compensation. The figures represent what would have been reasonable under the Tax
Court decision with adjustment for changes in the Consumer Price Index. Id.
83. 716 F.2d at 1248.
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A formula, according to the court, should compensate for
the work done, the performance achieved, the responsibility assumed and the experience and dedication of the employee. s• The
court noted that any implication on the part of the Tax Court
that incentive payment plans for shareholder-employees are unreasonable was e~roneous.SIi The court expressed approval of
such plans and their tendency to encourage extra effort and dedication which in turn contributes to the overall success of the
corporation. ss The court stressed that the mere fact that an employee is also a shareholder does not make the plan unreasonable as long as an independent investor would approve. S7
84.Id.
85. Id. The Tax Court had relied on the Schneider case for the rejection of incentive-bonus plans. The Schneider court focused on the lack of arms-length bargaining
which it considered to be precluded by the fact that the employee was the sole shareholder. "No special incentive was necessary to insure his best efforts for he would receive
the fruits of success through his status as the majority shareholder.... " 40
T.C.M.(CCH) at 811 (quoting Schneider, 500 F.2d at 153). The Tax Court, in Elliots,
rejected the significance of a longstanding formula to determine the compensation of a
sole shareholder and quoted Schneider. Schneider is distinguishable from Elliots due to
the nature of the agreements. Two percent of the net sales were set aside for taxes and
then the net profits were equally divided by the officer-shareholders. This system never
left any amount to be paid as a dividend and thereby precluded any payment of dividends. Although no dividends were paid, the Elliots formula allowed the payment of
dividends, if desired, since the bonus only incorporated 50% of the net profits. But see
supra note 72.
86.Id.
87. Id. The court's conclusion is supported by the language of Treas. Reg. § 1.1627(b)(2):
The form or method of fixing compensation is not decisive
as to deductibility. While any form of contingent compensation invites scrutiny as a possible distribution of earnings of
the enterprise, it does not follow that payments on a conthigent basis are to be treated fundamentally on any basis different from that applying to compensation at a flat rate. Generally speaking, if contingent compensation is paid pursuant to a
free bargain made before the services are rendered, not influenced by any other consideration on the part of the employer
other than that of securing on fair and advantageous terms the
services of the individual, it should be allowed as a deduction
even though in the actual working out of the contract it may
prove to be great~r than the amount which would ordinarily
be paid.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2). The application of this part of the statute becomes especially
significant when there is a sole shareholder such as Elliot involved. The statute approves
the use of contingent compensation but cautions that it should be "pursuant to a free
bargain." This causes difficulty in a closely-held corporation since it is inherently difficult to prove that the agreement was reached on objective grounds. The Ninth Circuit's
use of the "independent investor" becomes critical in reaching the threshold determination of whether the method of fixing compensation and the resulting formula (in contin-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

21

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10

192

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

IV.

CRITIQUE

[Vol. 15:171

In holding that no conclusive presumption of a disguised
dividend arises from the bare fact that a profitable corporation
does not pay dividends, the Ninth Circuit followed the tenor of
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-7. The regulation states that
"the compensation may not exceed what is reasonable under all
the circumstances."88 The court decided correctly that no one
factor is decisive in the determination of reasonableness. 89
Apparently the Internal Revenue Service recognized the
same reasoning in 1979 when they re-evaluated automatic indicators of disguised dividends. 90 Revenue Ruling 79-8 backed
away from the application of an automatic dividend rule in an
employee-shareholder lack of dividend situation, but characterized the lack of dividends as a "very significant factor."91 However, the ruling disallows a lack of dividends as the sole ground
for rejection of a deduction if the compensation is otherwise reasonable and is paid for services actually rendered. 92
Despite the language of the Treasury Regulations, Revenue
Ruling 79-8 and case law which emphasizes the factual nature93
of the reasonable compensation inquiry, the government attempted to utilize McCandless-type reasoning in both their Tax
Court and Ninth Circuit arguments in ElliotS. 94 The Ninth Circuit's unequivocal rejection of McCandless should return the
analysis of reasonable compensation back to that of "reasonablegent compensation situations) was reasonable.
88. Treas. Reg. § 1.l62.7(b)(3). See supra note 16.
89. 716 F.2d at 1248.
90. Rev. Rul. 79-8 C.B. 92.
91. Id. at 93.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 21.
94. See supra note 35. This approach diverges from the weighing of facts and inferences prescribed by the Mayson and Irby cases. See supra note 21. Most alarming is the
attempted use of the 15% figure as an automatic calculation. The corporation in McCandless was in the business of ceramic tile contracting and the years questioned were
1963-65. Elliots Inc. was in the business of selling and servicing John Deere equipment
and was questioned regarding the years of 1975 and 1976. The 15% figure in McCandless
has been criticized because the basis for it was never articulated by the court. There was
no justification for choosing that particular percentage and it would seem unwise to promote its future arbitrary application. It was probably this attempt to lift the percentage
out of the factual context of McCandless and apply it automatically to the Elliots facts
which prompted the Ninth Circuit to clarify this matter once and for all by rejecting the
automatic dividend rule.
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ness" and should ease the job of tax planners, at least in the
Ninth Circuit. 911 The loss of "lack of dividends" as a trigger for
disguised dividends will no doubt have an effect upon the scrutiny given the tax returns of sole shareholder-employees by the
Internal Revenue Service. 96
The decision to reject McCandless was primarily based on
the fact that no statute requires dividends to be paid by profitable corporations. 97 The court noted that the accumulated earnings tax 9S was intended to handle such abuses. This blanket
statement only clouds the issue instead of clarifying it.
It is true that the accumulated earnings tax comes into effect when a corporation allows profits to accumulate beyond its
reasonable needs. However, the inference that has created the
specific problem addressed in Elliots is not based on abuse due
to profits being allowed to accumulate. The inference is that
profits are not being paid as dividends nor accumulated because
they are being siphoned-off via the mechanism of disguised dividends in compensation. The problem is one of under-accumulation. The accumulated earnings tax cannot handle this abuse because there will be no accumulation to trigger its provisions.

The focus should be on what is a reasonable amount of
profit for a corporation to retain, not on how the profits which
are not retained are utilized. Profits can be visualized on a spectrum, with a reasonable amount of profit retention in the middle
95. See Walthall, supra note 31 at 1.
96. [d. at 3.
[O)nly a small minority of professional decisions concerning
the deductibility of compensation and the adequacy for tax
purposes of dividend distributions are made by courts in litigated cases. The majority of such decisions are made, in the
first instance, by lawyers and accountants consulting with
their clients in the business planning process. Even when the
Internal Revenue Service disputes the propriety of a portion
of the compensation payments or the adequacy of dividends,
the issues, in the overwhelming majority of cases, are settled
by negotiation. The decided cases, numerous as they may be,
reveal only the tip of the iceberg.
Id. at 3 n.6.
97. 716 F.2d at 1244. The rejection was also based on the fact that no law precluded
the reinvestment of dividends and that such activity may be in the best interest of the
corporation.
98. See supra note 49.
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and over-accumulation and under-accumulation on each end.
Accumulated earnings are statutorily penalized once they surpass a certain dollar amount on the profit spectrum. The statute
qualifies the demarcation between reasonable retention and
over-accumulation by allowing accumulations beyond a certain
dollar amount only if they are being held to meet the corporation's "reasonable needs." Therefore, the over-accumulation end
of the spectrum is ultimately limited by an analysis of the purpose for which the profits are being accumulated.
The confusion seems to center around the under-accumulation end of the profit spectrum. There is no statute to set a minimum dollar amount for retained earnings nor is there a qualification that less than that amount can be retained if there are
"reasonable needs." The focus is usually on how much profit
needs to be retained to insure viability and stability of the corporation. 99 There is an inference that if less than this amount is
retained, the security of the corporation may be jeopardized. loo
99. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 140 (1972), reh'g denied 409 U.S. 898
(1972).
Even where there are corporate earnings, the legal power
to declare dividends is vested solely in the corporate board. In
making decisions with respect to dividends, the board must
consider a number of factors. It must balance the expectation
of stockholders to reasonable dividends when earned against
corporate needs for retention of earnings. The first responsibility of the board is to safeguard corporate financial viability
for the long term. This means, among other things, the retention of sufficient earnings to assure adequate working capital
as well as resources for retirement of debt, for replacement
and modernization of plant and equipment, and for growth
and expansion. The nature of a corporation's business, as well
as the policies and long-range plans of management, are also
relevant to dividend payment decisions.
408 U.S. at 140.
100. In Byrum, the court stated:
The spectrum of types of corporate businesses, and of
permissible policies with respect to the retention of earnings,
is broad indeed. It ranges from the public utility with relatively assured and stable income to the new and speculative
corporation engaged in a cylical business or organized to exploit a new patent or unproved technology. Some corporations
pay no dividends at all, as they are organized merely to hold
static assets for prolonged periods (e.g., land, mineral resources, and the like). Corporations which emphasize growth
tend to lower dividend payments, whereas mature corporations may pursue generous dividend policies.
[d.
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To go below this level would require the qualification of "good
sound business reasons. "101
It can be reasoned, by analogy, that just as profits in excess
of those retained for "reasonable needs" can trigger the accumulated earnings tax, profits below the amount required for "good
sound business reasons" should trigger the label of "siphoned-off
profits." This approach focuses on the relative amounts retained
and the purpose for retention. The spectrum between
"siphoned-off profits" and accumulated profits is a matter of
degree.

Dividends are specific amounts of profit which are not retained. If a distribution of profits to shareholders is not made,
dividends should not be visualized as hovering within the accumulated profits, waiting to be distributed. If they are not declared, they do not exist. 102 A lack of dividends cannot trigger
the concept of "siphoned-off profits" because that mechanism is
based on an insufficient retention of profits and if a dividend is
not declared it does not reduce the degree of profits retained.
However, compensation does reduce the degree of profits retained. By analogy, the reduction in retained profits can be justified by "good sound business reasons" as long as the compensation meets the statutory requirements of section 162.103 If the
amount is found to be unreasonable, it is not justified by "good
sound business reasons" and triggers the label of "siphoned-off
profits." Accordingly, a disguised dividend is profit that, instead
of being distributed as a dividend, which could qualify as a
"good sound business reason," is "siphoned-off" under a com101. Capitol Markets, Ltd. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 376, 381 (D. Hawaii 1962).
The court stated that "there were good sound business reasons for this [funds retained
for expansion of the business], including the necessity to make payments on mortgages
and obligations of the company incurred in connection with new investments, and the
investment of earnings during a period of community growth justifying such action." [d.
102. The exception to this would be when evidence indicates that the compensation
in its entirety was not paid for services rendered. Then the dividends can be visualized
as "hovering" within the compensation as disguised dividend. Notice, however, that this
approach still does not search for the hidden dividend within the accumulated profits
and therefore avoids the idea that dividends are mandatory and that if none are distributed, they must be hidden somewhere. The assumption is that if they are hidden, it is in
the compensation. However, a second assumption should be that if they are hidden in
the compensation, they are only hidden in the part that is in excess of "reasonable."
103. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1978). See supra note 15.
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pensation label. This false labeling of the dividend as compensation, in order to gain tax advantages, is the evil which should be
avoided, not the lack of profits distributed as dividends.
The court cited Casey v. Commissioner and Laure v. Commissioner lO' to support its conclusion that the lack of statutory
authority is an indication that Congress purposely avoided requiring dividends to be distributed. Additionally, the court notes
that there is no law precluding the reinvestment of corporate
profits. 1011
The third justification for the rejection of McCandless was
that retention and reinvestment may be in the best interest of
the corporation. The court relied on United States v. Byrum
which noted the limited access of close corporations to capital
markets. lOS The court's acknowledgment of the special economic
104. 716 F.2d at 1244. Casey v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1959); Laure v.
Comm'r, 70 T.C. 1087 (1978). Neither case was Ninth Circuit precedent. The Second
Circuit stated:
We think that the 1954 enactments indicate that Congress
did not want the taxing authorities to be second-guessing the
responsible managers of corporations as to what extent profits
should be distributed or retained, unless the taxing authorities
were in a position to prove that their position was correct.
267 F.2d at 30. The Tax Court in Laure stated that they "doubt that section 162(a)(1)
was intended to permit the Commissioner or the courts to sit in judgment over whether
dividends should be paid in lieu of reasonable compensation to employee-shareholders."
70 T.C. at 1098.
105. 716 F.2d at 1244. However, as noted previously, the court recognized that although the retention of profits is not precluded, it may be limited by the accumulated
earnings tax. I.R.C. § 531-37 (West 1978). The court's viewpoint reflected the reasoning
of the following passage which was cited in the opinion:
The automatic dividend rule, as well as being unsupported by legal analysis, rests on inadequate economic analysis. The court's perception of the requirement of a return to
shareholders is unsatisfactory because it fails to assess adequately the following factors: (1) the concept of the return to a
shareholder should not be limited to current dividend payout,
but should include the potential of future return or appreciation; (2) the shareholder employee expects a return for services 8S well as a return to capital, and will seek to maximize
the total return; and (3) if a corporation is not unprofitable in
the sense that it fails to generate a sufficient return for both
the shareholder and employee functions, it does not follow
that the shareholder's function should be fully compensated,
thus allocating the "short-fall" entirely to employee function .
. Note, supra note 31, at 450 (cited 716 F.2d at 1244).
106. 408 U.S. 125. The Supreme Court reasoned that "directors of a closely held
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character of close corporations parallels the trend of greater flexibility in corporation statutes designed to promote close corporations. Such changes are reflected in the Model Business Corporation Act and corporation statutes of a growing number of
states. 107 The close corporation, although traditionally handled
under the same statutes as publicly held corporations, has different economic characteristics which are often met by special arrangements in the usual corporate model. By analogy, federal
tax policy should be responsive to the economic nature of the
close corporation. lOB
In Elliots, the Ninth Circuit sought to establish clear, predictable guidelines in the area of employee/sole shareholder
compensation by utilizing the "independent investor" test.109 In
this area where employee and shareholder roles overlap, it is understandable that there might be motivation for compensation
and dividends to overlap. The court's approach eliminates analysis of the actual motive or intent of the party by evaluating the
transaction according to the viewpoint of the "independent
investor."
The major difficulty in this area is the lack of the armslength bargaining prescribed by section 1.162-7(b)(2) of the
Treasury Regulations. 110 Although the problem is most obvious
in a close corporation, it must be recognized that the paradigm
arms-length transaction is difficult to find even in publicly held
small corporation must bear in mind the relatively limited access of such an enterprise to
capital markets. This may require a more conservative policy with respect to dividends
than would be expected of an established corporation with securities listed on national
exchanges." [d. at 140.
107. See Model Business Corp. Act § 35 (1982). See also Cal. Corp. Code §§ 158.
202(a) and 300.
108. A definition of close corporations which reflects the economics of this entity is
found in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England. 367 Mass. 578 (1975).
There is no single. generally accepted definition. Some
commentators emphasize "an integration of ownership and
management." ... in which the stockholders occupy most
management positions. Others focus on the number of stockholders and the nature of the market for the stock. In this
view. close corporations have few stockholders; there is little
market for corporate stock.
[d. at 585.
109. This term was suggested in Note. supra note 31. at 450.
110. See supra note 87.
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corporations. l l l The Ninth Circuit's use of the "independent investor" provides a test that will eliminate the subjective analysis
unless the evidence indicates otherwise. 112
The policy rationale behind an objective approach is important to close corporations because sole shareholder's transactions
are never strictly arms-length in nature. This approach recognizes that the "American dream," made up of small business
persons who are the epitome of free enterprise, would be undermined at its very foundation if the essential relationship of sole
shareholder-employee is characterized as a negative factor. 113
111. The officers are on the board of directors which votes for the salaries. See
supra note 59.
112. See supra note 60.
113. In order to determine the appropriate policies for governing corporate entities,
the question, "what is the typical corporation?" must be answered. During the years in
question in Elliots, the typical corporation was not a multi-billion dollar, multi-million
shareholder enterprise:
The number of active corporations in 1976 has been estimated to be 2,105,000. Statistical Abstract of the United
States 563 (1979). In terms of dollar asseta ... over 90 percent of U.S. corporations had assets of under a million, or
stated another way, the proportion of corporate millionaires to
the total number of corporations was less than one in ten.
Breaking this down even further, the biggest block of corporations have assets between $10,000 and $1,000,000 and the median corporation has assets of slightly under $100,000. A.
CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 100, 101 (1976). Thus
it would appear that in terms of size, corporations are spread
along an unbroken spectrum, with the greatest concentration
in numbers at the lower end.
It is also apparent ... that though corporations with assets of over ten million make up about 1.3 percent of the total
number of corporations, they also control 87 percent of the
total assets.
Another important consideration is the number of investors. Though there is less information with regard to this than
other aspects of corporate size, the available data on shareholders appear to fit the general pattern of corporate statistics. In 1971, General Motors, which ranked first in sales, had
about 1,360,000 shareholders; Standard Oil of New Jersey,
ranked second, had 808,000. But over 90 percent of the total
corporations have ten or fewer shareholders, 1 percent have
more than one hundred, and fewer than one hundred corporations have more than one thousand. CONRAD, supra at 119.
In summary, it is evident that since the greatest concentration of numbers is found in corporations with assets between $10,000 and $1,000,000 and with less than ten shareholders, if there were such a thing as the typical American
corporation, it would certainly not be the corporate giant.
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The better view is to encourage such relationships and examine
them from the perspective of the "independent investor."
The most revolutionary aspect of the court's opinion involved analyzing the contingent compensation formula as the
test for reasonableness. This approach is supported by Treasury
Regulation section 1.162-7(b)(2) which states that contingent
compensation should be allowed, if made pursuant to a free bargain, despite the fact that "in the actual working out of the contract it may prove to be greater than the amount which would
ordinarily be paid." The court uses the term "formula" to address the concept of the original contract between the employer
and employee. The court's common sense approach recognizes
that such a contingent compensation formula motivates employees to work harder. It also enables the court to dispel the myth
that a shareholder-employee will not be motivated by a bonus
because he will benefit whether he applies his best effort or not.
The court concluded that a reasonable, longstanding, consistently applied compensation plan is evidence of reasonable
compensation. 114 This approach takes the reasonableness focus
away from the amount paid which may fluctuate from year to
year under a contingent plan.
Obviously, such fluctuation in amount from year to year is
an inherent element of contingent compensation. lUI If evidence
of inconsistent compensation is the traditional test for unreasonableness, contingent compensation is suspect by reason of its
very design. 118 Although this might not be viewed as a problem
L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON, JR., D. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 7-8 (1982).
114. 716 F.2d at 1247. The court stated that inconsistency of past compensation is a
factor that could be indicative of the payments going "beyond reasonable." 1d. Although
the court cited no authority for this proposition, such a perspective has been forwarded
by both the Seventh Circuit and the Tax Court. Six years was seen as a long enough
period to aid in establishing reasonableness in Edwina, 501 F.2d 675. See Madison Silo
Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C.M.(CCH) 82, 86 (1952); Osborne Motors v. Comm'r, 35
T.C.M.(CCH) 691, 693 (1976).
115. "If the principal of bonus compensation is to be recognized, it carries with it
the payment of liberal compensation in good years and moderate compensation in lean
years." Roth Office 'Equipment Co. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1949).
116. Rapid increases in compensation should be avoided absent strong
proof that there has been a corresponding increase in the duties and responsibilities of the executives. The natural tendency of the IRS is to regard the earlier compensation ar-
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if the perspective is taken that there is always the alternative of
noncontingent compensation, this viewpoint ignores the policy
reasons behind contingent compensation which is to "encourage
and compensate extra effort and dedication which can be valuable to a corporation."ll7 There is truth to the argument that contingent compensation can provide a vehicle for "siphoning-off"
profits but such an intent can readily be discovered by objectively examining the formula in relation to the character and financial condition of the corporation.
An individual who accepts a contingent compensation plan
may do so out of an interest in seeing the young corporation succeed. A sole shareholder-employee may exhibit a willingness to
put off individual reward presently in order to further the corporate stability. liS This view is especially persuasive in the context
of a small corporation that is just getting started.
The court stressed that because the formula might overcompensate in some years and undercompensate in others, the determination of reasonableness should be made with a view of the
long term results. ll9 This approach will benefit companies which
have been in existence for a substantial period of time because
their average compensation over time can be identified and examined in order to mitigate the tax consequences of a few high
years.
A young corporation that initially overcompensates may be
penalized in the present despite the fact that the formula may
prove to provide less than adequate compensation in the long
run. A possible consideration in such a circumstance would be to
resort to a comparison of the formulas used by like companies,
for like positions. Such a comparison would yield an idea of the
average results under such a formula and show whether it is reasonable within the industry.
The court stated that a formula that was reasonable over a
rangements as establishing the standard of reasonableness for
the position in question.
Walthall, supra note 31 at 24.
117. 716 F.2d at 1248.
118. See James J. McHale Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 115 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
119. 716 F.2d at 1248.
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long period of time should not be deemed unreasonable solely
because it overcompensates for one or two years. 120 This reasoning may plague the Internal Revenue Service as it attempts to
show overcompensation in cases where only one or two years are
being examined. Taxpayers with a short corporate history will
argue that given the benefit of an average extended over, for example, ten years, the compensation would be reasonable.
This argument is not new in the sense that it has been
presented in cases where the taxpayer has argued that excessive
compensation was for undercompensated past services. 121 The
difficulty here is in timing because the reasonableness of the
contingent compensation is tied into its long term average which
is dependent upon when in the cycle of the corporation the IRS
issues its notice of deficiency. In a general sense, the reasonableness of anyone amount for anyone year is never completely
determined until the end of the employee-corporation relationship. From a more pragmatic viewpoint, the comparison of formulas used by like corporations over the same years will be
fairly helpful. The major problem is finding a corporation which
the court will accept as being "like" the one in issue. 122
The court pointed out that changed circumstances may
make a previously reasonable formula unreasonable. Conversely,
it would seem plausible for further changes in circumstances to
make the formula reasonable again. This part of the opinion will
be susceptible to abuse by both the taxpayer and the IRS. The
taxpayer will argue that the formula which the IRS labels as unreasonable might turn out to be reasonable given a few more
years. The IRS will argue that the circumstances have changed
and the fact that the formula was reasonable at inception is now
120. Id.
121. "The statute [Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7) does not require that the services should
be actually rendered during the taxable year, but that the payments therefore shall be
proper expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year." Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co.,
281 U.S. 115, 119 (1930).
122. [T)he courts very narrowly define "like" when considering comparative data. For comparative data to be acceptable, the
courts generally seem to require that the company be of the
same size and complexity, and that the number of management personnel as well as the scope of management responsibility be the same.
Hoffman, Heeding Significant Factors Improves Odds for Reasonable Compensation, 50
J. TAX'N 150, 153 (1979).
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irrelevant.
Again the timing will be the critical element because the
court has expanded the issue of reasonableness of annual compensation into the "lifetime" of the corporation-employee relationship. The much needed support that the opinion lends to
the area of contingent compensation insures this form of compensation a contuing role in motivating independent business
persons to take on the risks associated with ownership of a close
corporation. However, the lack of guidelines for determining the
relevant time period in which the contingent compensation
should be scrutinized may make it difficult for new corporations
to take advantage of this approach.
New corporations would seem to be the most reasonable
candidates for contingent compensation and are most in need of
the benefits of the long term averaging. The court's recommendation of the use of the "independent investor" may prove helpful in the analysis of compensation for small corporations with a
short history. As long as a reasonable return on equity is available, the lack of long term averages may not be a hindrance.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Elliots the Ninth Circuit reached sound conclusions.
However, the opinion does not address the issues surrounding
the applicable time period for determining the reasonableness of
compensation. The result bolsters the use of contingent compensation but refocuses the controversy to the reasonableness of the
formula. The analysis, however, is still factual in nature and the
sole shareholder is well advised to keep accurate records and
document activities related to compensation. Most importantly,
the formula should be reviewed from time to time to insure that
the compensation paid under it is reasonable not only for the
individual year but for the "lifetime" of the corporationemployee relationship.
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